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This article argues that authorisation and moral evaluation are the dominant 
 legitimation strategies used in asylum decisions by the Finnish Immigration  Service 
(Migri). After the migration events of 2015, the percentage of accepted asylum 
claims dropped dramatically in Finland, causing concern about the legal rights of 
 asylum seekers. Drawing on theoretical literature concerning asylum  decisions, 
 borders and language, this article is based on a systematic analysis of 77  asylum 
decisions. It aims to answer the following questions: What strategies of  legitimation 
does Migri use to support their negative asylum decisions? How are these  strategies 
used? The study reports that the reasons behind negative  asylum decisions are 
often not openly provided. Instead, the decisions largely rely on authorisation and 
implicit moral evaluation; the decision is so ‘because Migri says so’. This lack of 
transparency has adverse consequences for the due process of asylum seekers, and 
these consequences can be life changing.
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Introduction
After Europe’s border crisis in 2015, and as the physical borders of Fortress Europe failed, 
European governments harnessed asylum politics for the gatekeeping (Pellander 2015; 
Satzewich 2013) of migrants. As Enrica Rigo (2009: 137) aptly points out, a border never 
exists in a space, but it gets ‘activated’ as it is crossed or as people gather around it. Since the 
majority of asylum seekers sought asylum in Europe, an ample tool for this ‘policing’ at a 
distance (Guild & Bigo 2003) was asylum decisions. Asylum decisions are performative docu-
ments (Tiililä 2000) that either grant or deny a residence permit on grounds of international 
protection or other personal or humanitarian reasons. Thus, they are not merely texts; they 
determine whether or not an applicant can legally stay in a country.
Finland is a case in point in terms of harnessing asylum politics for gatekeeping. Before 
2016, Finland was above the European Union average in terms of its level of granted asy-
lums. However, in 2016, it sunk well below said average (Eurostat 2017). Since 2015, the 
country enforced various legal changes that negatively affected the rights of asylum seekers. 
These changes included removing one category of international protection from the law as 
well as restricting the presence of legal aids in asylum interviews. The asylum interview is 
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perhaps the single most important event in the asylum process, as it is where the asylum 
applicant presents their asylum grounds. Thus the restriction essentially meant that after 
2015, the asylum applicants have increasingly been expected to present their case without 
legal aid. These measures have raised questions and criticism about how the human rights 
and due process of asylum seekers are met. Indeed, in their research, Saarikkomäki et al. 
(2018) show that the decrease in granted asylums could not be only due to the said legal 
changes, but that they were likely also due to changes in the internal practises of the Finnish 
Immigration Service (Migri), who are in charge of assessing asylum claims in Finland. The 
changes in practises were, for example, limiting the time reserved for an asylum interview 
and raising the bar of the credibility assessment (i.e. requiring more details and evidence from 
the asylum applicants in order to deem their persecution narrative as credible and, hence, 
‘true’) (Saarikkomäki et al. 2018).
Asylum decisions and processes have previously been the subject of academic research, 
especially from the perspectives of interpretation and psychology (Herlihy, Jobson & Turner 
2012; Herlihy & Turner 2009). Recently, there has been increased interest in studying the 
production of interview protocols (Díez 2011) and asylum decisions (Johansson Blight 2015; 
Vogler 2016; Wikström & Johansson 2013). In many cases, research has focused on particular 
groups of asylum seekers, such as women (Berger 2009; Melloy 2007), vulnerable families 
(Johansson Blight 2015) and sexual minorities (Berger 2009; Millbank 2009). Most often, 
the research is based on a small number of asylum cases. Studies based on fairly extensive 
data, thus providing a more general view of the process, are more scarce (see Ramji-Nogales, 
Shoenholtz & Schrag 2007; Vogler 2016).
This article aims to answer the following interrelated research questions: What strategies of 
legitimation does Migri use to support their negative asylum decisions? How are these strate-
gies used? Legitimation refers to the strategies of justifying and making sense of controversial 
acts (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Legitimation is an essential aspect of decision making, 
because according to the Administrative Procedure Act (2003) of Finland, legal decisions 
need to state the reasons for the decision as well as the information and circumstances that 
have affected the end result. In order to answer these questions, the study uses a systematic 
analysis of 77 first-instance asylum decisions related to those who sought asylum in Finland 
for various reasons, such as political, ethnic and religious persecution. With 77 decisions, 
the data are quite extensive. Thus, the current study contributes to the growing literature 
on asylum decisions and processes by using qualitative methods to systematically examine 
extensive data that comprise a variety of asylum applicants.
The current article specifically focuses on legitimation, as legitimation is not merely a ver-
bal strategy but also an aspect of social practises (Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 
1999). Thus, although the current study concentrates on legitimation in asylum decisions, 
legitimation serves a greater purpose in the border regime. Essentially, the belief that asylum 
decisions are made and legitimised correctly is a prerequisite for the legitimation of varying 
recognition rates, changing asylum politics and the entire border system. That is, if we believe 
that borders are necessary but that granting protection to those in need is a part of a fair bor-
der system, this belief presumes that those in need are indeed correctly granted protection. 
Thus, the border system, especially in the context of international protection, rests on the 
principle of accurate and just decisions.
The Asylum Process as a Form of Gatekeeping
The asylum process is regulated by various conventions, laws and guidelines. According to the 
1951 Refugee Convention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
asylum is granted to a person who
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owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country. (UNHCR 1951: 14)
Finland has ratified the convention through the Aliens Act of Finland (2004). In addition, 
the UNHCR has provided guidelines on the procedure and criteria for determining refugee 
status. Although not binding, the guidelines are intended to guide governments in applying 
the asylum process (UNHCR 2011: 2).
Seeking asylum is not only an administrative but also a highly physical process perme-
ated by a power imbalance. Indeed, it characterises the institutional and not always physical 
nature of borders (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013). In Finland, Migri is responsible for examining 
and deciding on asylum applications. According to the Administrative Procedure Act (2003) 
of Finland, authorities have an obligation to obtain all necessary information to decide on the 
matter. Indeed, the UNHCR (2011) guidelines state that the responsibility to ascertain and 
evaluate all necessary information in the asylum process is shared between the asylum seeker 
and the relevant authority. Still, it is necessary to point out that the asylum seeker and the rel-
evant authority do not share equal positions of power. Rather, for example, asylum interviews 
are what Fairclough (1989: 47–49) has referred to as ‘gatekeeping encounters’. Similar to a 
job interview – an example used by Fairclough – the interviewer is familiar with the require-
ments of the law as well as how to conduct asylum interviews and make decisions, whereas 
the asylum seeker cannot be expected to be familiar with these elements. Thus, the entire asy-
lum process is a physical act of gatekeeping, often marked by non-linearity and waiting lasting 
from some months to several years (Karakayali & Rigo 2010; Könönen 2015; Rigo 2009: 150), 
as it determines who is legally allowed to stay within state borders and who is asked to leave.
One of the most crucial elements of asylum decisions, and thus of gatekeeping, is the cred-
ibility assessment. Asylum should be granted if a person has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted in their country of origin (UNHCR 1951: 11). Traditionally, the assessment has 
been divided into two parts – namely, internal and external credibility (e.g. Sweeney 2009). 
Furthermore, Wikström and Johansson (2013) suggest a third category of credibility – social 
credibility. Internal credibility refers to how internally cohesive the account of the asylum 
seeker about their persecution is. Among other things, it is measured by examining how 
logical, detailed and coherent their account is (e.g. Wikström & Johansson 2013: 94). It is 
also based on how the applicant presents their fear (Noll 2006: 500). External credibility 
compares the applicant’s narrative with available external information regarding, for exam-
ple, the applicant’s country of origin and provided documentary evidence. Social credibility 
refers to the sociocultural perspective used to read the applicant’s narrative. This implies 
that the authorities use their own normative angles in asylum assessment, even though they 
may not consciously acknowledge this (Wikström & Johansson 2013: 93–94). Indeed, pre-
vious research shows that the backgrounds of the authorities (Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz 
& Schrag 2007) as well as the internal culture of the institution and wider societal culture 
(Johansson Blight 2015) affect asylum decisions.
Thus, this article views asylum decisions as a form of border control, where the act of gate-
keeping is conducted not by border officials but by immigration officials in charge of applying 
the requirements and regulations of admission (see Pellander 2015; Satzewich 2013) through, 
among other things, the credibility assessment. Thus, it is what Guild and Bigo (2003) have 
called ‘policing’ at a distance, where the actual decision about asylum is made not at the state 
border but in an office removed from said border. In the current practise of seeking protec-
tion from a state, one must do so within the physical borders of that state.
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The Four Strategies of Legitimation
The current article concentrates on legitimation in asylum decisions. It follows the model 
suggested by Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999; see also Van Leeuwen 2007), who used it to 
study family reunification documents in Austria. With legitimation, Van Leeuwen and Wodak 
refer to acts – particularly discursive acts – that attempt to construct and justify controversial 
practises or events and make them look acceptable, necessary and even desirable. Asylum 
decisions certainly fall within such controversial acts. Although there are many aspects to 
the asylum process, these aspects are solidified in the decision, which, according to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (2003), is meant to list all the information and circumstances 
that have affected the decision.
Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) define four types of legitimation – namely, authorisation, 
rationalisation, moral evaluation and mythopoesis. The first type, authorisation, comprises 
the form of legitimation that refers to authority:
The answer to the implicit or explicit question ‘Why is it so?’ or ‘Why must it be so?’ is 
essentially ‘Because I say so,’ or ‘Because so-and-so-says so,’ where the ‘I’ or the ‘so-and-
so’ is someone in whom institutionalized authority is vested. (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 
1999: 104)
According to Van Leeuwen (2007), no reasons or explanations are required for a decision – 
only that ‘so-and-so says so’. In turn, the second type of legitimation, rationalisation, makes 
the reasoning more explicit. Instead of drawing on authority, rationality explains and calls 
for certain logic, purposes and means. Here, the answer to the question ‘Why is it so?’ is 
because the decision is logical and achieves a certain purpose or goal. The third type, moral 
evaluation, can according to Van Leeuwen & Wodak (1999), be defined as the legitimation of 
decisions by either explicitly or implicitly drawing on one’s moral values. Moral evaluation 
can be conducted explicitly by deeming something to be desirable. When moral evaluation 
is conducted in an implicit way, certain values are implied to be ‘good’ by treating them as 
‘good’ without explicitly stating so. The fourth type of legitimation, mythopoesis, refers to 
legitimation through storytelling. The story is used as either a moral or cautionary tale. With 
the moral tale, the protagonist follows a recommendable path of events and is rewarded in 
the end; with the cautionary tale, the protagonist makes wrong choices and ends up unhappy. 
How this translates to asylum will be discussed in the analysis.
Data and Methods
The data of the current article consist of 77 negative first-instance asylum decisions made by 
Migri. The article concentrates on negative decisions because most positive decisions from 
the era – after 2015 (Saarikkomäki et al. 2018: 11) – include scant legitimation, as the deci-
sions do not explicate why they agree with the applicant’s asylum claim, they simply state 
that they do. In addition to the decisions, the study uses 42 related interview protocols (i.e. 
protocols written during the asylum interview and repeating the questions asked and answers 
given) as complementary data. Thus, although the detailed analysis focuses on the decisions, 
the interview protocols are analysed and referred to in order to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the decisions. The decisions in the data were made between March 2016 
and March 2017. Hence, the decisions represent a period during which the percentage of 
accepted asylum claims dropped considerably in Finland.
As for the asylum applicants in the data, the majority are adult men, but the data also include 
adult women and families. For ethical reasons, no decisions of unaccompanied minors were 
included. As for the asylum seekers’ reported fear of persecution, they are related to ethnicity, 
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religion, political views, honour-related violence or work. The data do not include any sexual-
minority asylum seekers. Whereas, persecution based on political, ethnic or religious reasons 
clearly forms the basis for international protection, work-related reasons do not. Honour-
related reasons remain a grey area (Berger 2009). Of the 77 applicants, 50 are Iraqi citizens 
and 27 are Afghan citizens. These were the two largest groups of asylum seekers arriving to 
Finland in autumn 2015. However, in 2015, the majority of both groups – more than 80% of 
Iraqis and almost 70% of Afghans – were given international protection in Finland, accord-
ing to Eurostat (2017). However, following changes in asylum legislation and practises, in 
the third quarter of 2016, only 16% of Iraqis and 38% of Afghans were granted international 
protection in Finland.
Asylum decisions are classified as confidential in Finland; hence, the asylum decisions and 
other related documents were gathered directly from the asylum seekers. The data gathering 
was realised as part of a project that aims to map the situations of asylum seekers in Finland 
and support them. Thus, the applicants who received these decisions do not agree with them. 
As such, although the data are not representative of all the decisions made by Migri, it does 
provide excellent examples of the kind of decisions that have questioned and criticised the 
human rights and due process of asylum seekers in the aftermath of increasingly strict asy-
lum policies.
In relation to the data, certain ethical considerations have been taken into account. Firstly, 
the decisions themselves include confidential and sensitive information. When the people 
handed over their decisions, they were asked to sign a release form, usually in Arabic or Dari. 
In the form, they were able to choose whether they wanted their decisions to be processed 
as part of a larger data set or if part of their decisions could also be published. The current 
article only uses direct quotations from the decisions that were permitted to be made public. 
For the other decisions, the article paraphrases the cases so that the identity of the applicant 
cannot be recognised. Additionally, all the examples are discussed anonymously, and any 
information that might reveal the identity of the applicant has been concealed. The asylum 
applicants are referred to by pseudonymous only. Secondly, when the applicants gave us their 
decisions, many of them wanted help with their cases. I made it clear that the data would be 
used for research purposes and, thus, would not provide immediate help, if any. However, 
because of certain language and cultural barriers, it was difficult to ascertain whether all the 
applicants truly understood this. Thirdly, in addition to this research project, I have been part 
of other projects that work to support asylum seekers. Within this work, I have personally 
got to know some of those whose decisions are included in this article. However, in the clear 
majority (72 in total) of cases, I do not personally know the applicants.
By the end of the analysis, the data were saturated (i.e. the last cases analysed did not pro-
vide any new insights and were similar to earlier cases). Thus, it is likely that the current data 
are quite representative of similar negative decisions made in Finland. In my role as a volun-
teer aide to asylum seekers, I have additionally read through roughly 250 negative asylum 
decisions. They also show similar features to the data analysed here. This further indicates 
that the data are exceedingly representative of similar cases.
The analysis was carried out systematically by using Fairclough’s discourse analytic 
approach (1989, 2003). Firstly, the data were thoroughly examined and areas where internal, 
external and social credibility were discussed were highlighted. Secondly, special attention 
was paid to the areas where Migri examined and argued for credibility and where strategies 
of legitimation were used. Since legal decisions do not usually need to argue indisputable 
points (i.e. where the views of the authority and applicant concur; Virolainen & Martikainen 
2010: 55), the current analysis concentrates on the areas where Migri disputed the credibility 
of the applicant.
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The Domination of Authorisation and Moral Evaluation
The analysis shows that while the decisions involved all four strategies of legitimation, 
authorisation and moral evaluation were the dominant strategies, whereas rationalisation 
and mythopoesis were rarely used.
Let us look at Kasim’s decision as an example. The document begins by listing Kasim’s 
personal information, summarising his application and the end result of the decision. The 
documentary evidence provided by Kasim is also listed. This is followed by a credibility assess-
ment and legal assessment, which generally comprise the longest sections of decisions in 
relation to asylum. These assessments are followed by shorter sections that concern residence 
permits on personal compassionate grounds (Aliens Act of Finland 2004: section 52) as well 
as sections related to deportation, voluntary return, appeal, execution of the decision and 
references.
The current analysis mainly concentrates on the credibility assessment, because this forms 
the basis of the end result. However, the analysis also utilises other aspects of the document 
as necessary. The structure of the credibility assessment in relation to Kasim’s decision is 
presented in Table 1.
Kasim’s decision has been used as an example here because it is quite typical: It mixes dif-
ferent strategies of legitimation by using authorisation, rationalisation and moral evaluation. 
In the analysed decisions in general, authorisation and moral evaluation are also typically 
combined and are both more common than rationalisation or mythopoesis. Thus, authorisa-
tion and moral evaluation represent the most typical strategies of legitimation. In the data, 
the strategies of legitimation also vary by their placement in the decisions: Authorisation and 
rationalisation are typically used in all parts of the assessment, whereas moral evaluation is 
mainly used in the external credibility assessment and mythopoesis in the internal credibility 
assessment.
The following sections present a more detailed analysis of the four strategies of legitima-
tion. We begin with rationalisation, as by its nature this is one of the more explicit – and 
therefore more visible – strategies. This will be followed by authorisation, moral evaluation 
and mythopoesis.
Table 1: The topics of credibility assessment in Kasim’s decision, arranged by paragraph.
Paragraph Topic
1 Confirming personal information
2 Rephrasing the narrative of Kasim
3 Credibility assessment by Migri
4 Rephrasing the narrative of Kasim
5 Credibility assessment by Migri
6 Credibility assessment by Migri
7 Information about the general security situation in country of origin
8 Information about the general security situation in country of origin
9 Information about the general security situation in country of origin
10 Information about the general security situation in country of origin
11 Assessment of the general security situation by Migri
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Recommended Rationalisation?
When the decisions use rationalisation, the text is detailed and quite transparent: It high-
lights the exact events of persecution and aspects of the applicant’s story that lack detail, 
logic or coherence and how these manifest (see Wikström & Johansson 2013: 94). This can be 
seen in Hossein’s decision:
Two days later you got assaulted at your work place, but you were able to escape 
through the window. What you have told about when your assaulters came to your 
work place has been very undetailed. You have not been able to describe more specifi-
cally how you have been assaulted, what you had been told during the events or what 
the assaulters looked like. You have not known how long the events lasted and you 
have not been able to tell how you were able to escape through the window while 
being assaulted. […] Considering the circumstances above, the Finnish Immigration 
Service does not accept as a fact that […] you would have got assaulted at your work 
place. (Hossein’s decision)1
The passage is legitimised by rationalisation, as events considered to be lacking detail in 
Hossein’s account are listed. The list includes how the assaulters arrived, how they assaulted 
Hossein, how they looked or what they said, how long the assault lasted for and how Hossein 
escaped. Thus, by listing information about the lack of detail given in relation to certain 
events, the decision shows why the entire narrative of the applicant is seen as insufficiently 
detailed, and thus, not sufficiently credible.
It can be said that although rationalisation is a fairly rare strategy in the current data, I find 
it could be a recommendable one. In fact, when it comes to administrative decisions, such as 
asylum decisions, the ideal of explicitly explaining the reasons for the end result seems to be 
inherent within them. According to the Administrative Procedure Act (2003), those making 
decisions need to be transparent about their reasons for said decision – hence the rationalisa-
tion behind it. This has several functions. Virolainen and Martikainen (2010: 41–48) point out 
that when an authority presents the reasoning behind a decision, they also control whether 
their decision is correct based on law. A well-supported decision also provides a good base for 
an appeal and court assessment of the decision because the court is then able to see and thus 
evaluate the proper reasons behind the decision. Furthermore, the obligation to explicate the 
reasoning behind a decision enables democratic control in terms of the wider legal community.
Uncontrolled Authorisation
Authorisation presents itself in the decisions in two ways – namely, by making general argu-
ments about the credibility of the applicant’s account and by not making any arguments at all 
and instead stating or even implying that the applicant’s narrative is not credible.
An authoritative argument commonly used in the decisions to dispute credibility is that the 
narrative is too vague and lacks detail, as also noted by Saarikkomäki et al. (2018: 27–29). This 
is apparent in Kasim’s decision:
What you told [us] about the threats you received [in your home town] has remained 
general and unspecified. The Finnish Immigration Service does not accept as a fact 
what you told [us] about the threats [in your home town]. (Kasim’s decision)
The legitimation strategy here is indicated by the fact that, unlike in Hossein’s decision, 
Migri does not provide in the decision any reasons for Kasim’s narrative being ‘general and 
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unspecified’. Before the excerpt presented here, what Kasim has said about events in his 
home town is rephrased. Following the excerpt, the events that happened after Kasim left 
his home town are mentioned. Thus, neither before nor after are any comments made that 
would posit why the narrative is considered to be lacking in detail – it is merely stated. 
Thus, in the decision, Migri does not provide information about their reasons to the appli-
cant, their lawyer or the court (Virolainen & Martikainen 2010: 40–41). Instead, the only 
reason they give to the question of ‘Why is it so?’ is ‘Because Migri says so’ (cf. Van Leeuwen 
2007: 95; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 104–105). Thus, relying on the authorisation strat-
egy can be quite problematic, as is the case with the decision of Reza. In the decision, Migri 
simply states:
What you have told [us] about getting kidnapped and being released was general. 
(Reza’s decision)
Similar to Kasim’s decision, prior to Reza’s excerpt, Migri simply includes in the decision, in 
quite a factual manner, the account of his kidnapping without indicating that said account is 
too vague. After the excerpt, the evidence provided by Reza is discussed, and the lack of detail 
in his account is not further legitimised. Thus, Migri uses the ‘generality’ of Reza’s narrative 
as a reason to dismiss said narrative and deny him asylum. However, when Reza’s decision is 
compared to his interview, it seems that the statement concerning his lack of detail is quite 
contradictory. In his interview, Reza states:
When we had left [the place] came a car with darkened windows, and people came out 
of the car with guns and hit me and [another person] to the back of the head and after 
that I was put into the car. They put a bag over my head so I wouldn’t see anything. 
When they hit me in the head, I lost consciousness and I woke up when I was sitting 
backwards in a chair with my hands and legs tied and a bag over my head. […] Two peo-
ple came into the room, I deducted it from the sounds. They took away all my clothes, 
they only left my underpants on. They said that I’m a traitor, why do I work with the 
foreigners. Two people bad-mouthed me and called me names all the time, I was a 
traitor and an agent, and there was a smell of cigarettes. They had smoked cigarettes 
and they butted out the cigarette on my back. I heard crying and yelling of people in 
there. This happened a lot, there was yelling and then it became quiet. (Reza’s inter-
view protocol)
Based on this excerpt, it seems that the claim in the decision about Reza’s narrative being too 
‘general’ is not in line with the interview. In fact, the excerpt reproduced here forms less than 
half of Reza’s entire account of his kidnapping. He describes the sensory details of sounds 
and smells, which is in line with his story of having a bag over his head. Thus, the account is 
quite detailed.
This contradiction may be because of a lack of the controlling function, as pointed out 
by Virolainen and Martikainen (2010: 48). According to Virolainen and Martikainen, when 
an authority presents the reasoning behind their decision, they are also forced to control 
whether or not their decision is correct and based on the law. This is especially impor-
tant in asylum decisions, because studies (e.g. Johansson Blight 2015; Ramji-Nogales, 
Schoenholtz & Schrag 2007) evidence that decisions are affected not only by facts and laws 
but also by the personal opinions of the authorities. When decisions rely on the authorisa-
tion strategy, and the authorities are not obligated to properly explain their decisions, the 
control function is lost.
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Implicit Moral Evaluation
While there is little explicit moral evaluation in the decisions, there are many ways in 
which Migri makes abstract moral evaluations in the decisions. The current article distin-
guishes four domains from which Migri draws values to base their decisions on – namely, 
the value of the law, the value of country information, the value of parental care and the 
value of income.
The value of the law refers to the emphasis on and value of the perfection of the law. This 
perfection is used in the legitimation of decisions. The right to seek asylum is based on sev-
eral international agreements and has been ratified in the Aliens Act of Finland. Thus, each 
asylum decision ends with a legal assessment. While the assessment is based on the preced-
ing credibility assessment, the legal assessment presents itself as a purely logical chain. For 
example:
The Finnish Immigration Service sees that you have not faced acts as mentioned in 
Aliens Act section 87a to be considered persecution, that would be caused by the rea-
sons of persecution as mentioned in section 87b […].
The example seems to present a perfectly logical chain: The applicant has not fulfilled the 
requirements of the law; therefore, based on the law, they shall not be granted asylum. 
However, what is left quite implicit in this legitimation is the claim that the applicant has 
not faced acts of persecution, which is based on the credibility assessment, which is far less 
logical.
Unlike the other examples presented in this article, the example presented above is not 
given a specific source, as it is highly prevalent and is repeated verbatim in countless deci-
sions. This is likely due to the use of model documents, which, according to Tiililä (2007: 
119, 142–146), are a way of making asylum decisions more efficient, equal and personal. The 
example also overlaps with other legitimation strategies (Fairclough 2003: 99), as the law is 
treated as an example of moral evaluation. Additionally, the example also represents law as 
the highest form of authority: Asylum should be granted on particular parameters by particu-
lar officials because ‘the law says so’.
The value of country information refers to the assumption that the country information pro-
vided is objectively and absolutely truthful. In this sense, it is treated similarly to the law. In 
this article, country information refers to the information provided about the general status 
of society in the applicant’s country of origin. In the decisions, this information serves two 
purposes. On one hand, it is used to assess whether the applicant is telling the truth; on the 
other hand, it is used to evaluate how safe it is for the applicant in particular and for people 
in general to return to said country.
In practise, country information provides only a situated and limited perspective of the 
situation of a country. This is partly because country information is typically based on 
several sources; these sources, in turn, are also based on several sources. For example, the 
first sources could be interviews or news stories, which are then turned into a report by 
the UNCHR, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), or by the individual immigration 
offices in various European countries. These reports may be turned into yet another report 
and then into a passage for the asylum decision. Thus, the country information comprises 
an intertextual document, in which each phase entails the reframing of information as 
well as the inclusion and exclusion of information. This is apparent in the decision made 
in relation to Abdul.
Abdul’s case is related to moral crimes, specifically premarital affairs between men and 
women. Drawing on country information provided by the UNHCR, the decision states:
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A relationship between a young woman and a young man outside of or before marriage 
is a severe offence against the honour of the families, especially to that of the young 
woman’s family. The family of the woman can for this reason threaten to murder both 
their own daughter and in some cases also the son (Abdul’s decision).
Based on the passage in relation to country information, Migri makes the following state-
ment in the decision:
According to the country information presented above, the threat of honour violence 
is additionally directed primarily to women. (Abdul’s decision)
This is all that is said about the possible threat of honour-related violence (i.e. violence related 
to ensuring the honour of the family) against Abdul; thus, Migri seems to take the account 
of country information as the absolute truth. This is shown in the way that the decision does 
not even assess whether Abdul, with his particular case, might be one of those ‘sons’ who may 
be in danger. Nor does it argue or explain why he, according to the decision, is not in danger. 
Indeed, the fact that Migri does not believe Abdul to be in danger because of honour-related 
violence is not explained. Rather, it is only Migri’s refusal to grant him asylum that highlights 
this lack of belief. For a discussion on gender-based and honour-related violence in relation 
to asylum claims, see Berger (2009) and Wikström and Johansson (2013).
The value of parental care refers to how Migri makes a moral evaluation in relation to said 
care. According to this value, a child’s right to be with their parent is more important than 
the other rights of children, such as security or education. According to the Finnish law, when 
making decisions for a child under the age of 18, special attention should be paid to the best 
interest of the child. However, what exactly paying special attention to the best interest of 
the child means seems to be left to the authorities to decide. Here is an example from Migri’s 
decision in relation to Adela and her mother, Saida:
Taking into account the young age of [Adela] and that [Adela], because of her young 
age, has not yet been able to form strong ties to Finland, no significant obstacles for 
the child to adapt in her home country […] together with her guardian are seen. […] The 
Finnish Immigration Service sees, taking into account the best interest of the child as 
a whole, that it is in her best interest to grow and develop in a way suitable for her, 
surrounded and supported by her loved ones in your home country […]. (Saida and 
Adela’s decision)
This example is repeated almost verbatim in numerous asylum decisions made concerning 
families. Migri claims that the decision aims to assess ‘the best interest of the child’. However, 
Migri seems to reduce ‘the best interest of the child’ to simply being with her mother, Saida. A 
child’s right to be with their parents is certainly an important right, but it is not the only one. 
According to the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child (UNHCR 1990), a child 
also has the right to, among other things, security and education. However, this is not in any 
way commented on or assessed in the decision. This is especially poignant in the decisions 
made in relation to Afghan children, as few girls in Afghanistan have access to education, and 
many are married off before the age of 18.
The value of income refers to the assumption that work is merely a way of making money, 
thus signifying nothing about the values or lifestyle of the applicant. In the data, there are 
numerous cases where applicants report persecution based on their work, usually because 
they have worked with foreigners or in a profession that is viewed as non-Islamic. In these 
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cases, Migri usually states in the decision that since the applicant has already stopped working 
– because they have left their country – they can safely return and take on another occupation.
What the decisions do not consider is how a choice of occupation can reflect a person’s val-
ues. For example, if a person chooses to work with foreigners, this can be indicative of the fact 
that they are open to, or at least not against, foreigners. If a person chooses to work in a non-
Islamic profession (e.g. selling alcohol), this indicates that they are not overly concerned with 
following the teachings of Islam. This, however, is not taken into account in the decisions or 
interview protocols. An analysis of the protocols shows that the questions posed by Migri 
almost exclusively aimed to verify whether the applicant has worked in the profession they 
say they have. Migri does not aim to clarify the reasons that they have chosen this profession. 
Thus, it seems that Migri does not try to ascertain whether the applicant’s work is a way for 
them to earn a living, whether it represents their values or religious or political convictions, 
or whether their work could be interpreted as representing said values and convictions by 
persecutors. This is essential, as even though values or lifestyle are not covered by legislation 
as an official reason for persecution, religious and political convictions are.
The value of income appears to be predominantly associated with assessing an applicant’s 
social credibility. In Finland, people are not usually persecuted because of their profession 
or beliefs related to said profession; Migri seems to assume that this is also the case in other 
countries. This is what Wikström and Johansson (2013) refer to as ‘normative leakage’ – when 
an immigration authority uses certain normative standards without realising or acknowledg-
ing this use. An example of this is an assessment of persecution in Iraq that is based on the 
social norms of Finland. Thus, as McKinnon (2009) writes, asylum applicants must be able 
translate the persecution they have experienced into a language that the authorities prefer.
Mythopoesis and Counter-Narratives
Mythopoesis (i.e. the act of legitimation through narratives) is certainly an important form 
of legitimation in asylum decisions, partly because of the nature of asylum seeking. As the 
UNHCR (2011: 38) guidelines state: ‘Often […] an applicant may not be able to support his 
statements by documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evi-
dence of all his statements will be the exception rather than the rule,’ because, in most cases, 
‘a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities’. Consequently, 
although mythopoesis is heavily present in the current data, it is mainly present as a legitima-
tion strategy used by the asylum seekers, not by Migri.
However, also Migri uses mythopoesis as a legitimation strategy when they create alternative 
storylines or counter-narratives. In asylum decisions, mythopoesis relates not only to the events 
narrated by the asylum applicant but also to the cause-effect relationship between the applicant 
and the events (i.e. the events happened because of how the applicant is). An example of this is 
the case of Ali. In his interview protocol, Ali explained that he ran a shop in his home country. 
The shop had previously been run by his brother, but after his brother was killed, Ali took over. 
Ali recalled how he went to open the shop one day and was injured by a bomb that had been 
placed at the door of the shop. Following his recovery, he received a phone call in which he was 
told that he would be killed, just like his brother, because he had worked with foreigners.
In their decision, Migri challenges Ali’s narrative by creating an alternative narrative. First, 
Migri accepts the events of Ali’s narrative (i.e. that Ali’s brother was killed and that Ali was 
injured in an explosion and was threatened over the phone). After this, however, Migri builds 
a counter-narrative about the meaning of these events. According to Migri, the bomb was 
not directed at Ali personally but was ‘due to the generally poor security situation in the 
area’. This statement indicates that although Ali’s brother was killed and that Ali himself was 
injured in an explosion and received a death threat, these events were not directly related 
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to one another or to Ali. In Migri’s counter-narrative, they become individual incidents that 
coincidentally involved the same person. Thus, according to Migri, there was no cause-effect 
relationship between the events and Ali: The events were not because of Ali, but because 
of the overall security situation. Thus, they do not pose a threat to him, and Migri used this 
counter-narrative to deny asylum.
Hence, in the current data, mythopoesis is used as a strategy to legitimise plausibility and 
either prove or disprove the applicant’s need for asylum. The role of mythopoesis is quite dif-
ferent from the moral or cautionary tales described by Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999). It is 
also different from the example of mythopoesis provided by Fairclough (2003: 99) of ‘build-
ing up of a picture of the “new age”’. The overlap of legitimation strategies (Fairclough 2003) 
is also noteworthy, as within mythopoesis, Migri also used the authorisation strategy. This is 
highlighted in the way that Migri does not explain why their narrative is more plausible than 
that of Ali, the asylum applicant – this seems to be assumed, because it is the narrative of 
the authority. This also implies a further overlap with moral evaluation, where it is assumed 
that the authority is automatically more trustworthy than the asylum applicant. This echoes 
previous research, which points to a ‘culture of disbelief’, indicating the deep distrust that 
asylum authorities feel towards asylum applicants. It is expected that the applicants will lie, 
so the applicants must specifically prove to the authorities that they are telling the truth (e.g. 
Herlihy & Turner 2009; Johansson Blight 2015; Millbank 2009; Sweeney 2009).
Conclusion and Discussion
This article has examined the strategies of legitimation used by Migri in supporting their neg-
ative asylum decisions as well as how these strategies have been used. The article has shown 
that in legitimating asylum decisions, Migri relies heavily on authorisation and moral evalu-
ation, both of which are quite vague and opaque legitimation strategies. This has numerous 
consequences for the due process of asylum cases.
First, since these strategies render the arguments and logic behind the decision almost 
invisible, the method of legitimation does not support the appeal process (Virolainen & 
Martikainen 2010: 41–42). In fact, it does quite the opposite. This is because it is difficult 
to argue against and make clearer important aspects of the process when it remains unclear 
what kind of logic Migri used to make the decision in the first place.
Second, Virolainen and Martikainen (2010: 48) point out that public officials use ration-
alisation in their decisions so that they themselves can double-check their reasoning behind 
the decision (i.e. whether their logic really holds and if they have really made the correct 
decision). Since the negative asylum decisions made by Migri lack this element, it raises the 
question, in the case of Reza, for example, of whether the authorities making the decisions 
have actually double-checked their own logic and reasoning. If this kind of double-checking 
is seen as necessary when it comes to administrative decisions about transportation of the 
disabled – an example used by Tiililä (2007) – it would certainly be well-founded to do so in 
asylum decisions, as from the perspective of the applicant, those decisions are life changing.
As the entire system of asylum rests on the assumed fairness, accuracy and transparency of 
asylum decisions, this study shows that the decisions of Migri question the workings of the 
system. As Migri mainly relies on the strategies of authorisation and implicit moral evalua-
tion, this makes their decisions difficult to assess or verify and, thus, to really see whether the 
decisions are fair and to correct them if they are not. Although the data used in the study are 
not representative of all asylum decisions made by Migri, it does provide insight into how the 
service presents its decisions and why the due process of asylum seekers has caused concern 
and criticism in Finland. Indeed, the study proves that those expressing concern about asy-
lum decisions have concrete grounds on which to do so. In order to retain the legitimacy of 
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the asylum system and thus enable the protection of those in need, the legitimacy of asylum 
decisions has to be taken seriously.
Note
1 The translations from the original Finnish language have been made by the researcher.
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